Kosher Pork by Allan Drazen & Ethan Ilzetzki










We thank participants at the Stanford/UWI/CaPRI conference on Political Economy of Institutions,
IIES Stockholm, the Spring 2010 NBER Political Economy Program Meeting, the Princeton Conference
in Dynamic Political Economy, Collegio Carlo Alberto, the NBER Summer Institute, University of
British Columbia, Birmingham, and Columbia University for many useful comments. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Allan Drazen and Ethan Ilzetzki. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Kosher Pork
Allan Drazen and Ethan Ilzetzki




Both conventional wisdom and leading academic research view pork barrel spending as antithetical
to responsible policymaking in times of crisis. In this paper we present an alternative view. When
agents are heterogeneous in their ideology and in their information about the economic situation, allocation
of pork may enable passage of legislation appropriate to a "crisis" that might otherwise not pass. Pork
"greases the legislative wheels" not by bribing legislators to accept legislation they view as harmful,
but by conveying information about the necessity of policy change, where it may be impossible to
convey such information in the absence of pork. Pork may be used for this function in situations where
all legislators would agree to forgo pork under full information. Moreover, pork will be observed when
the public good is most valuable precisely because it is valuable and the informed agenda setter wants












Pork-barrel spending given to speci￿c groups or districts at general expense is commonly
seen as bene￿tting the recipients while hurting everyone else. The public associates pork
with ￿politics as usual￿as lawmakers satisfy their love of earmarks meant to bene￿t their
constituents. This is to be distinguished from responsible policy making, in which legislators
put their love of pork aside in times of ￿crisis￿ , that is, when speci￿c public goods have very
high social value.
In a highly in￿ uential paper Battaglini and Coate (2008) present a model formally captur-
ing this di⁄erence in policy-making regimes. Depending on the social value of public goods
and on the level of outstanding debt, which determines pre-existing claims on revenues, the
economy may be in either of two regimes. In BAU (￿business as usual￿ ), the agenda setter
distributes pork to members of the (minimum winning) coalition. In contrast, in RPM (￿re-
sponsible policy making￿ ), when the social value of public spending is high and/or debt is
high, no pork is distributed to re￿ ect the combination of high value of public good spending
and low ￿discretionary￿revenue.
RPM is not surprising if there is general agreement on the high social value of public
goods, that is, general agreement on the existence and magnitude of a ￿crisis￿ , re￿ ecting
common information. Similarly, general agreement on public goods expenditure in a time
of acknowledged crisis is possible when legislators are homogeneous in their preferences over
spending. That is, all agree there is a crisis, on its depth, and on what should be done.
This is the assumption of Battaglini and Coate (2008): legislators are identical in their
preferences, speci￿cally having identical valuation of public goods expenditures in di⁄erent
states of nature; and they are equally informed and hence in agreement about the state of
nature. Politics is entirely distributive, that is, determines who receives pork when there is
agreement on politics as usual. Alternation of who has the spending power, combined with
the possibility of adopting policy measures with less than unanimous legislative consent,
leads to pork-barrel spending in non-crisis times, but no pork in crisis when spending on
public goods is highly valued.1.
1The central role of ￿minimum winning coalitions￿ in this line of research is sometimes contrasted
with ￿universalism￿in the provision of pork (see, for example, Weingast [1979]). We follow much of the
literature in assuming MWCs in a legislative equilibrium and not addressing the phenomenon of super-
majority coalitions.
1In reality, we do not see such a simple dichotomy, where pork disappears in times when
certain types of spending are agreed to have a high social value. This is no doubt due in part
to such agreement being less common than the above paragraph suggests. It is certainly also
due to the nature of legislative decision-making, where enacting major legislation requires
￿deal-making￿ . In fact, observation suggests not simply that pork does not disappear when
high-priority legislative initiatives are adopted, but that provision of pork may be critical to
the passage of such legislation ￿witness the failure of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program
legislation to pass in the House of Representatives on September 29th and its subsequent
passage merely four days later when pork was added; or, the more recent passage of major
health care legislation in the U.S.2
The more basic issue these observations raise is that the assumption of identical legis-
lators, though analytically convenient in studying some issues, is not very realistic. Even
considering a single economic policy, legislators di⁄er in their beliefs about what the eco-
nomic situation is, as well as in what they think is optimal policy in speci￿c situations. Of
course, this point is more general in economics, since the ￿representative agent￿assumption
is an approximation. For many questions, this assumption, though not strictly true, can
be justi￿ed because the basic results are not changed by adding the complication of hetero-
geneity. Is that true in studying the political economy of pork barrel spending in legislative
politics? That is, does the assumption of representative legislators ￿legislators who are
identical in their policy preferences and information ￿matter qualitatively for studying the
role of pork barrel spending in the legislative process? Is handing out pork antithetical to a
￿responsible￿policy-making in times of crisis, or, quite to the contrary, important in getting
support for emergency measures?
The purpose of this paper is to address these questions. Our principal conclusion is that
heterogeneity in legislators￿ideology and information matters quite a bit in understanding
how pork may be used when public spending has a high social value.3 We ￿nd that intro-
ducing heterogeneity of this sort signi￿cantly changes the conventional wisdom about the
distinction between BAU and RPM summarized in the opening paragraph. We ￿nd that in
2See http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/10/03/MNR813AHDN.DTL and
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/dec/20/reid-compromise-gives-sweet-medicaid-deal-nebraska
3Baron and Diermeier (2001) consider a model of legislative bargaining with heterogeneity of legislators￿
preferences over policy, but agreement across legislators about the state of the world. See footnote 14 for a
comparison of a key result.
2situations that would lead to RPM under full information, pork will be given by the agenda
setter to signal the state with asymmetric information. Moreover, pork will be observed
when the public good is most valuable, not when it is less valuable. That is, pork is not
antithetical to ￿responsible policy making￿but in fact crucial to policy being able to re-
spond to a high valuation of the public good. We also ￿nd that in BAU pork may go to
all legislators (￿Complete BAU￿ ) or only some (￿Partial BAU￿ ); in the latter case, it may
be either the agenda setter or the coalition partners who get pork, with the agenda setter
getting none in the latter case. This contrasts with standard ￿divide-the-dollar￿models of
legislative bargaining, in which the agenda setter gets more pork than her coalition partners.
The logic of our results that pork may be used when the public good is most valuable may
be explained as follows. Suppose the agenda setter believes there is a crisis and thinks special
legislation is called for, but other lawmakers with di⁄erent preferences and information, do
not agree. Passage of the legislation the agenda setter favors may require deal-making, that
is, the agenda setter giving other legislators something in exchange for their support. Usually
this may be thought of as bribing legislators to gain their support. However, di⁄erences in
opinion about the current state suggest another, perhaps less obvious, sort of interaction to
gain support. If the agenda setter has superior information about the state, she may use
policy choice to try and inform other legislators about the state. If she uses pork to do so,
information transmission is conceptually di⁄erent from bribing other legislators where their
beliefs about the state are unchanged.
In the paper, we concentrate on a positive analysis of pork ￿showing how pork may allow
information transmission about the state of nature which would be impossible in the absence
of pork ￿rather than on a normative analysis. We believe, however, that our results have
signi￿cant normative implications as well. Pork implies a set of public goods policies which
would not be politically feasible if pork were restricted. Some of these policies would imply
higher social welfare than the no-pork status quo, but which policy emerges from the political
process depends on the political mechanism; more speci￿cally, it depends on the bargaining
protocol between the agenda setter and other legislators in the winning coalition. We analyze
a ￿closed amendment￿process where the agenda setter makes ￿take-it-or-leave-it￿o⁄ers. In
this case, there are equilibria where allowing pork increases welfare and equilibria where
pork reduces welfare. The latter arise primarily because of the agenda-setter￿ s ability to
extract all the bargaining surplus from other coalition members. We nevertheless show that
3even when pork is welfare reducing when the agenda setter receives all bargaining surplus,
the feasible bargaining set includes policies where allowing allocation of pork increases social
welfare. These feasible bargaining outcomes are consistent with the agenda setter having less
bargaining power and other coalition members having more. An ￿open amendment￿process,
allowing coalition members to make counterproposals in the political process ￿which would
be a more realistic description of the legislative process ￿may allow these superior outcomes
to be reached. Hence, our positive analysis may serve as the basis for an analysis of alternative
legislative processes, more descriptive of how legislatures actually work, which would show
how pork improves welfare under asymmetric information.
We also argue that in the absence of pork (or some primarily distributive policy), analo-
gous information transmission may not be possible. This result provides a comparison ￿and
counterpoint ￿to Cukierman and Tommasi (1998a,1998b), in which the known ideological
bias of the agenda setter, combined with asymmetric information, makes it impossible to
adopt policy appropriate to the state of nature if it coincides with the agenda-setter￿ s bias.
The addition of pork to the policy menu may make it possible to adopt such policy in this
situation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present some evidence of
asymmetrically-informed lawmakers. In section 3 we set out the basic model and the legisla-
tive process, as well as de￿ning political equilibrium in the model. In section 4 we derive the
political equilibrium under full information and characterize the various regimes. Section 5
presents the general characterization of an asymmetric information equilibrium and shows
that when pork is restricted to be zero under asymmetric information there is no signaling of
the state. In section 6, the conceptual heart of the paper, we demonstrate the informational
role of pork both in BAU and in what would be RPM under full information. In section 7
we discuss some welfare implications of our results. Section 8 presents conclusions.
2 Asymmetrically Informed Legislators
Crucial to our argument about the signaling value of distributive policies is that lawmakers
di⁄er both in their information about the state of the world and in their ideology about
what policy should be adopted in a given state of the world. An agenda setter may therefore
want to transmit information to other di⁄erentially informed lawmakers about the state of
4the world. Note that for a positive analysis of the use of pork in the legislative process
under asymmetric information, the agenda setter￿ s information need not be correct, but
only di⁄erent from that of other legislators. (A possible improvement in welfare due to the
signaling role of pork of course depends on the agenda setter￿ s information in fact being
superior.)
The leading example of agenda setters being better informed is the case of standing com-
mittee chairs, for example in the U.S. House and Senate. Committee chairs (and to a lesser
degree members) exhibit a higher level of expertise on topics covered by their committee due
to self-selection into the committee, and through experience serving on the committee. The
drafter of legislation probably gains additional information about the state of the economy
relevant to the proposed bill in the process of drafting legislation. Moreover, committee chairs
and other agenda setters are better informed about topics for which they propose legislation
due to the increased intensity of lobbying by special interest groups (who themselves are well
informed about the topics on which they lobby) towards these legislators.4 The permanent
committee system in the U.S. Senate means that ￿the committees assumed the prerogative
of determining which substantive provisions the Senate should consider, and they became
policy-making bodies instead of merely technical aids to the chamber. Whereas the Senate
formerly set the agenda, the committees came to be, in e⁄ect the Senate￿ s ￿agenda-maker.￿ 5
The same is true, perhaps even more so, in the U.S. House of Representatives, since House
committee members specialize more than those in Senate. As Asher (1974) puts it, ￿con-
gressmen accomplish their business largely by relying on the judgment of others.￿See also
Shepsle (1988) in this regard.
In short, the organization and e⁄ective operation of Congress via the committee system
means that those in positions of agenda-setting power on an issue are better informed and
relied upon on that issue.
Although conventional wisdom is that lawmakers may have similar information in times
of extreme crisis when there is a ￿need for action￿ , we do not agree. Though there may
be a common perception that there is a crisis which calls for a policy response, there will
likely be disagreement among lawmakers about the causes, development, and magnitude
of the crisis. Hence, in addition to any di⁄erences in preferred response due to ideological
4See, for example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (2002).
5http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/brie￿ng/Committees.htm
5di⁄erences, lawmakers will likely disagree about the nature of the crisis and hence about the
policy response. This was certainly the case for the 2008 ￿nancial crisis in the U.S. and the
Bailout bill in September and October. This was true in other countries as well. In Spain,
for example, in 2008 there were heated debates between the incumbent PSOE party, led by
Zapatero, and the opposition party PP, led by Rajoy, about the severity of the economic
downturn.6
Another example concerns New York State. Though the state is facing large budget
shortfalls in the current economic downturn, ￿a lot of [state] legislators don￿ t feel the sense
of emergency,￿or, as one legislator put it,￿it￿ s not clear that the sky is in fact falling￿ .7 In
contrast, Governor Patterson viewed the ￿scal shortfall with such alarm, that he proposed
cuts in his own ￿pet projects￿ , it would appear to emphasize the severity of the budget
situation.8 This obviously points to heterogeneous beliefs about the magnitude of the States￿ s
budget crisis among state legislators, where the administration proposing budget cuts faces
disagreement the how serious the problem really is. In this paper we explore the possibility
that cuts in pet projects could be more than mere budgetary necessity, but also an attempt
to signal information about the severity of the State￿ s ￿scal standing.
We further note that observing pork in major legislative packages, such as TARP or
health care as mentioned above, does not necessarily tell us whether it is being used to
inform or to bribe legislators to get their support. Discriminating the actual functions of
pork in speci￿c cases is an interesting, albeit di¢ cult task. It is particularly challenging given
that our theory implies that in equilibrium pork barrel spending will have both informational
and bribing roles. In this paper we explore the possibility that there are uses for pork other
than bribing in which the agenda setter can transfer information by giving pork to other
legislators and forgoing it herself. We hope that our theoretical work will inform future
empirical explorations of the of role pork barrel spending as a communication device in
legislatures.
6We are indebted to Monica Martinez-Bravo for bringinging this to our attention. See for exam-
ple, http://www.libertaddigital.com/economia/zapatero-se-burla-del-congreso-con-un-discurso-triunfalista-
en-plena-crisis-1276334002/
7http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/410/social-contract , minute 28.




Consider a legislature consisting of n districts, each with the following preferences over the

















where g and ci are the consumption of public and private goods, respectively, and l is the
supply of labor. z + ￿i is a parameter that a⁄ects the marginal value of the public good
to households and includes a term z that is identical across districts and another term ￿i
that is idiosyncratic to the speci￿c district. ￿i 2 f￿￿;0;￿g, with ￿ > 0, representing right-
leaning, centrist and a left-leaning districts (where here ￿left￿is de￿ned as having a stronger
preference towards the provision of public goods.) Let nL, nC and nR represent the number
of districts of each type, with nL + nC + nR = n. The households maximize utility over the
following budget constraint:
c
i = (1 ￿ ￿)l + s
i; (2)
where ￿ are labor taxes, the pre-tax wage is equal to unity, and si are transfers from the
central government (pork). The household￿ s ￿rst order conditions give
l(￿) = ["(1 ￿ ￿)]
" ; (3)
which re￿ ects the fact that distortionary taxes a⁄ect the supply of labor. (Though " is
literally the elasticity of labor supply, it primarily governs the extent to which taxes are
distortionary, and could be interpreted more generally as the ine¢ ciency inherent in the tax















v (g) + s
i:
The ￿rst term is a combination of households￿utility from consumption net of si (that is,
from (1 ￿ ￿)l) and from the disutility of labor l. Note that this is only a function of ￿ and















"+1 ) denotes the utility from leisure and labor-￿nanced consumption.
3.2 Information structure
The values of ￿i are common knowledge, but only the agenda setter observes z. She attempts
to obtain the support of m￿1 other legislators, with m representing the size of the minimum
winning coalition to pass a policy.9 Otherwise, a default policy is enacted. Let nR <
m and nL < m so that no partisan legislator can pass legislation without the support
of centrists. Other legislators do not observe z but have expectations based on a prior
distribution z 2 fz; ￿ zg with probabilities f1 ￿ p;pg respectively. Let ze ￿ p￿ z + (1 ￿ p)z
be the expected value of z prior to the legislative round. These information assumptions
represent the potentially superior information of agenda setters on some policy matters
discussed in section 2. Consistent with the notion that the z = z state re￿ ects normal times,
while z = ￿ z re￿ ects a crisis, we assume that p < 1
2. We will state explicitly whenever this
assumption a⁄ects our results.
3.3 Political equilibrium
We consider the case with three legislators, with nR = nC = nL = 1 and m = 2:10 Suppose
that the agenda setter is ￿left-wing￿in that ￿AS = +￿.11 It should be apparent that it is
￿cheapest￿for her to build a coalition with the centrist (C) legislator. She proposes a policy
￿
g;￿;sC;s￿￿
. A feasible policy satis￿es
g + s
C + s
￿ ￿ R(￿) ￿ X (5)
where X denotes prior obligations which must be met (for example, debt service) and R(￿)
is government revenue as a function of ￿ de￿ned by
9For ease of exposition, the agenda setter will be female, the independent legislator male.
10When there are more than three legislators, the basic arguments are the same.
11We do not model how the agenda setter is chosen. She could be randomly chosen, with our analysis
focusing on the information transmission problems when the agenda setter has a partisan bias.
8R(￿) ￿ 3￿"
" (1 ￿ ￿)
" ;
from R(￿) = 3￿l(￿) and l(￿) given by (3). We naturally assume that X < R(￿max); where
￿max = 1
"+1 is the revenue-maximizing tax rate. Any obligations exceeding this level would
not be serviceable, and in a richer dynamic model, with non-defaultable debt, such levels of
debt would violate the government￿ s transversality condition.
If support is not obtained, a status quo policy of g = gq;sC = s￿ = 0 is implemented (with
￿q given implicitly by R(￿q) = gq +X).12 To summarize, the agenda setter wants to choose
a feasible policy that maximizes ^ u(￿) + (z + ￿)v (g) + s￿ while ensuring the participation
of the centrist, whose alternative is the status quo.
3.4 The status quo and preferred policy
Our focus on the problem of information transmission suggests considering a status quo
policy which the centrist would consent to change only if he believed that the state is z = ￿ z:
A simple assumption in this respect is that the status quo policy is that which would be
chosen by a social planner who distributes no pork and who does not know the value of z.
In other words, the status quo solves
￿
q = argmax
￿ f^ u(￿) + z
ev fR(￿) ￿ Xgg:
The optimality of ￿q when no legislator knows the state means that our results are not driven
by extreme assumptions about the default policy.
It is also useful for the exposition to de￿ne the most preferred policy of any legislator in
the absence of pork as
￿
￿ (￿;X) = argmax
￿ f^ u(￿) + ￿v [R(￿) ￿ X]g; (6)
where we note that ￿￿ (￿;X) is increasing in both ￿ and X.13 This equation may be solved
12Battaglini and Coate (and much of the literature) assume an alternative bargaining protocol in which
the failure of the agenda setter to gain support for her proposal implies another round of bargaining in which
another legislator is randomly chosen to make an o⁄er. However, the features of equilibrium in their paper
would not change if they used the protocol we use here given their assumptions on legislator homogeneity
and perfect information.





3￿, which implies the above drivatives.
9for
￿vg [R(￿
￿ (￿)) ￿ X] = ￿(￿
￿ (￿;X)); (7)
that is, a legislator with preferences ￿ for the provision of public goods who is constrained not
to distribute pork will equate her marginal value of the public good ￿vg (g) to the marginal
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Our assumption about the status quo policy combined with the assumption that the agenda
setter is left-wing (￿ > 0) implies that the following must be true of desired tax rates:
￿
￿ (￿ z + ￿;X) > ￿
￿ (￿ z;X) > ￿
q > ￿
￿ (z;X) (9)
The second two inequalities simply re￿ ect the assumption on ￿q summarized in (8), so that
￿ z > ze > z implies ￿￿ (￿ z;X) > ￿q > ￿￿ (z;X). The ￿rst inequality follows simply from a
left-wing agenda-setter preferring higher taxes than the centrist in a given state of nature.
The potential problem faced by the agenda-setter under asymmetric information comes
from the relationship between the preferred policy of the centrist in a ￿crisis￿(z = ￿ z) and the
agenda setter in ￿normal￿times (z = z). There is no con￿ ict if ￿￿ (￿ z;X) > ￿￿ (z + ￿;X);
that is, when the di⁄erence in policy preferences due the state of nature outweighs the
di⁄erence due to di⁄erent ideology (or ￿ z ￿ z > ￿). In this case, ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿;X) > ￿￿ (￿ z;X) >
￿￿ (z + ￿;X) > ￿￿ (z;X). The agreement on the need for higher taxes in ￿ z than in z means
policy itself may signal the state.
A problem arises for the agenda-setter, however, when her preferred policy even in normal
times exceeds that of the centrist in a crisis. When ￿￿ (z + ￿;X) > ￿￿ (￿ z;X), the agenda-
setter￿ s ideology implies that she would like higher spending no matter what the state (￿ >
￿ z￿z). Under asymmetric information the centrist doesn￿ t know whether the agenda-setter￿ s
proposed higher spending (which the centrist would accept when z = ￿ z but not when z = z)
10re￿ ects a crisis or simply the agenda-setter￿ s taste for high spending. The ranking of preferred
policies is
￿
￿ (￿ z + ￿;X) > ￿
￿ (z + ￿;X) > ￿
￿ (￿ z;X) > ￿
q > ￿
￿ (z;X) (10)
The agenda-setter can gain agreement of the centrist to raise taxes above the status quo ￿q
if she can convince him the state is ￿ z rather than z, but her con￿ ict of interest with the
centrist over ideological preferences for high or low spending presents her with a cheap talk
problem.14 This is the problem we want to consider, so from here on we assume that ￿ >
￿ z ￿ z so the ranking in (10) holds.
4 Full-Information Benchmark
As a benchmark and as an aid in understanding the possible informational role of pork, we
begin with the case of full information. The nature of the equilibrium that obtains depends
on the parameter values ￿; ￿ z; and z.
4.1 The agenda-setter￿ s optimization problem
When the value of z is common knowledge, the agenda setter proposes legislation for z 2
fz; ￿ zg that maximizes
max
g;￿;fsig
^ u(￿) + (z + ￿)v (g) + s
￿ (11)
subject to
^ u(￿) + zv (g) + s
C ￿ ^ u(￿
q) + zv (g
q); (12a)
^ u(￿) + (z + ￿)v (g) + s
￿ ￿ ^ u(￿




￿ ￿ R(￿) ￿ X; (12c)
s
C ￿ 0; (12d)
s
￿ ￿ 0: (12e)
14This is is the Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) environment. There the ideological bias of (for example)
a left-wing policymaker implied she wanted to change policy in her desired direction even if there was no
change in the state of the world. She has no way of signaling that the changed state of the world calls for a
leftward policy shift, so that she is unable to enact socially optimal policy. This is exactly the problem here
where no pork is available. However, the addition of pork (or some other policy) may enable the left-winger
to signal and enact optimal policy.
11where (12a) is the participation constraint of the centrist, while (12b) is the ￿participation
constraint￿of the agenda setter. It can be shown that under full information (12b) is always
slack (as long as equilibrium implies a deviation from the status quo) and (12a) is always
binding in equilibrium. (12d) and (12e) are the non-negativity constraints, which will be
useful in characterizing whether the equilibrium is BAU or RPM.
4.2 Policy choice when z = z
We exposit the case where z = z, which will also give the policy choices in a separating
equilibrium under asymmetric information under separation in this state. (The full informa-
tion case where z = ￿ z has no relevance for asymmetric information and is technically more
complex. It is treated in Appendix A.2.)
The assumption that ￿ > ￿ z ￿ z, so that (10) holds, means that desired tax rates are
￿￿ (z + ￿;X) > ￿q > ￿￿ (z;X). This implies the following ranking of marginal cost of
taxation (equivalent for all legislators) and the marginal bene￿t of public goods in the status
quo (which di⁄ers across legislators):
zvg (R(￿
q) ￿ X) < ￿(￿
q) < (z + ￿)vg (R(￿
q) ￿ X): (13)
This ranking re￿ ects the con￿ ict of interest described earlier. While the agenda setter would
prefer a policy mix with higher taxes and higher government expenditure, all else equal, the
centrist would prefer a policy mix with lower taxes and lower government expenditures.
A key observation in deriving regimes is that while these relative magnitudes are ￿xed
by the assumption that ￿ > ￿ z ￿ z, the absolute magnitudes are not. The absolute mag-
nitudes will also depend on X, which therefore determines the nature of the equilibrium.
This full-information characteristic parallels Battaglini and Coate (2008) when X represents
preexisting debt-service requirements which determine whether the economy is in BAU and
RPM.
Ideological di⁄erences between the agenda setter and the centrist imply that BAU is
comprised of two regimes: one where both legislators obtain pork as in the homogeneous
legislator case, which we term ￿Complete￿BAU; and one where only the centrist gets pork,
which we term ￿Partial￿BAU, just enough pork to get him to agree to the spending and
12tax changes the agenda setter proposes. Hence, including RPM in which neither legislator
gets pork, there are now three regions of the state space. Which region obtains depends on
the values of the marginal cost of taxation and the marginal bene￿t of public goods in the
status quo. This may be summarized as
Proposition 1 If p < 1
2, there are three regions of the state space which are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive.
1. RPM when ￿(￿q) > 1 or when 1 > ￿(￿q) > ((z + ￿)vg (gq)=(1 + ￿)vg (gq)). Neither
legislator gets pork and the equilibrium is the status quo;
When ￿(￿q) < 1 and ￿(￿q) ￿ (z + ￿)vg (gq)=(1 + ￿vg (gq)), there are two possibilities:
2. Complete BAU when
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g


























3. Partial BAU when
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g














Only the centrist gets pork.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition of this division of the state space is as follows. When the marginal cost of
taxation in the status quo is above the value of pork (￿(￿q) > 1), then no pork will be given.
With every legislator agreeing that the marginal value of pork is lower the marginal cost
of taxation ￿even if he were the sole bene￿ciary ￿pork cannot be part of the equilibrium
proposal. The equilibrium may still be one with no pork even if ￿(￿q) < 1 if there is no
division of increased tax revenue when ￿ > ￿q between higher g and pork for the centrist that
makes both the centrist and the agenda setter better o⁄. The last equality in part 1 of the
proposition must be reversed for such a division to exist. When this inequality is reversed
(and (￿(￿q) < 1), pork will be given in the political equilibrium, that is, the equilibrium will
be BAU, where one or both legislators will get pork.
13Whether both legislators or only the centrist gets pork when ￿(￿q) < 1 and pork is
consistent with both legislators being better o⁄ depends on the common marginal value of
pork, the collective marginal value of the public good to the two legislators ((2z + ￿)vg (￿)),
and the collective marginal cost of taxation. Note ￿rst that ￿ in political equilibrium can






the value of the tax rate such that the marginal cost of taxation to the entire coalition 2￿(￿)
is equal to 1, the common marginal value of pork. At any lower tax rate, the marginal cost
of taxation would be less than 1
2, so that each coalition member would favor higher taxes for
pork equally distributed.







< 1 (that is, the collective value of pork exceeds the
collective marginal value of g when all net revenues at ￿ = ￿BAU go to g) then pork is





￿ X ￿ s￿ ￿ sC￿
= 1. Both coalition members get
pork and we are in Complete BAU.







> 1, the agenda setter prefers higher g to
receiving pork and gives the centrist enough pork to induce him to accept the increase in ￿
and g above the status quo that the agenda setter desires. In equilibrium, ￿ > ￿BAU.
These possibilities may be illustrated in the top panel Figure 1 (shown below in section
6 in the discussion of asymmetric information), giving the importance of the magnitudes in
(13) relative to 1: Since the relative values of the marginal bene￿t of the public good to the
centrist, of the marginal cost of taxation, and of the marginal bene￿t of the public good to
the agenda setter in the status quo are ￿xed by the assumption that ￿ > ￿ z ￿ z, rather than
sliding this ranking along the real number line, one can equivalently think of ￿sliding 1￿over
this ranking as represented in the diagram in the center.15
15An alternative interpretation of the number lines in Figure 1 is as representing decreasing values of X as
we move to the right. As all the values on the central axis increase (in absolute terms and thus relative to the
value 1) as X increases, lower values of X would place 1 farther to the right along this number line. There
is a mapping between values of X￿ decreasing along the axis￿ and the cuto⁄ points between the regimes.
145 Asymmetric Information
We now begin our consideration of asymmetric information about the state z. Our equilib-
rium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
5.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the political game is de￿ned as fol-
lows:
1. Given coalition members￿beliefs on the state z, which we denote ~ z, the agenda setter (in
each state z = ￿ z and z = z) o⁄ers a proposal that satis￿es the following:
max
g;￿;fsig
^ u(￿) + (z + ￿)v (g) + s
￿ (15)
subject to the constraints (12a), (12b), (12c), (12d), and (12e). In other words, the proposal
maximizes the agenda setter￿ s utility subject to the participation of the coalition member and
the non-negativity constraints.
2. Beliefs ~ z are consistent with the strategies of the agenda setter when z = ￿ z and z = z:
As usual, the de￿nition of the PBE does not restrict beliefs on z o⁄ the equilibrium
path, and equilibrium re￿nements will be necessary to restrict the large number of PBE that
emerge from this de￿nition. We will use the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion to rule out
￿unreasonable￿o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs.
There are two types of candidate equilibria of the asymmetric information model. In a
Pooling equilibrium, the agenda setter proposes the same legislation 8z 2 fz; ￿ zg: Coalition
members beliefs (other than those of the agenda setter) are ~ z = (1 ￿ p)z + p￿ z when ob-
serving this legislation. In a Separating equilibrium the z = z agenda setter chooses his full
information policy analyzed above, while the z = ￿ z agenda setter chooses policy the z = z
agenda setter would not mimic. Coalition members￿beliefs are ~ z = z when the optimal
proposals of the z = ￿ z and the z = z agenda setters are observed.
In the separating equilibrium when z = ￿ z; the agenda setter proposes a policy that
maximizes her utility, subject to the participation of the centrist, and subject to informing
that z = ￿ z. This additional informational constraint augments the maximization problem in
15De￿nition 1 with





z is the agenda setter￿ s utility in the separating equilibrium when z = z. That is,
the proposal when z = ￿ z is informative only if it would be undesirable for the agenda setter
to mimic if z = z. The ￿rst order conditions of this maximization problem are outlined in
Appendix B.
In a candidate pooling equilibrium, on the other hand, when z = z, the agenda setter
successfully mimics the proposal of the z = ￿ z agenda setter. The information set of the
centrist is accordingly ~ z = ze. The z = ￿ z agenda-setter￿ s proposal given the centrist￿ s beliefs
is the solution to the full information problem de￿ned by (11) and (12), but where (12a) is
replaced with
^ u(￿) + z
ev (g) + s




In this candidate equilibrium, the agenda setter z = z simply mimics this proposal.
Our main results are, ￿rst, that if no pork is allowed, pooling at the status quo is the only
equilibrium; there is no separating equilibrium. Hence, in the absence of pork, the agenda-
setter￿ s information about the state cannot be transmitted. In sharp contrast, when pork is
available a separating equilibrium always exists, and it is the only equilibrium that satis￿es
the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. No pooling equilibrium satis￿es this criterion. Hence,
when pork is available, the equilibrium is separating and the agenda setter can successfully
reveal the state through use of pork. For any X that doesn￿ t exhaust total possible revenues
R(￿max), some of revenue will go to pork, so that when z = ￿ z only BAU exists. There are
no RPM equilibria when z = ￿ z because it is pork which allows policy to respond to the high
value of public goods. Hence, pork is not antithetical to ￿responsible policy-making￿ , but
integral to it.
5.2 Restricting Pork
As a benchmark, we begin with the case in which pork barrel spending (i.e., earmarks) is
restricted by law (which ￿conventional wisdom￿sees as socially bene￿cial.) The maximiza-
tion problem is that given in De￿nition 1, with the additional constraint that sC = s￿ = 0.
With this restriction on parameter values, legislative bargaining is over g and ￿, alone, which
16subject the budget constraint (12c), is equivalent to a choice of a single policy instrument ￿.
The main result is that when pork is restricted to be zero, the only equilibrium is pooling
at the status quo policy ￿q = ￿￿ (ze;X): Separation is not possible. To see why, note ￿rst that
given the centrist￿ s information ~ z = ze, the status quo policy ￿q is already the optimal policy
for the centrist. Thus, any change in policy without changing the centrist￿ s information set
would violate his participation constraint and would therefore be infeasible. In other words,
the only pooling equilibrium is at ￿ = ￿q.
To see why no separating equilibrium is possible, recall the ranking in (10) consistent with
￿ > ￿ z￿z, where ￿￿ (z + ￿;X) > ￿￿ (￿ z;X). Any tax increase the centrist would accept when
he believes ~ z = ￿ z would also be preferred relative to the status quo by the agenda setter
when z = z. Hence, any shift in policy acceptable to the centrist would be mimicked by the
z = z agenda setter. Separation requires the z = ￿ z agenda setter to shift policy farther to the
left than would be acceptable to the z = z agenda setter, but a shift so far to the left would
also be unacceptable to centrist even though he believes ~ z = ￿ z. Hence, no proposal satis￿es
both the informational constraint and the centrist￿ s participation constraint. Therefore no
separating PBE exists, and we are left with pooling at ￿ = ￿q. We summarize this result in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If pork is exogenously restricted to zero, the unique PBE equilibrium is pool-
ing at the status quo.
Proof. In the text above.
As no separating PBE exists, the unique PBE is the pooling equilibrium where the agenda
setter proposes the status quo regardless of the state of nature z. Information transmission
in the legislature is never possible in the absence of pork. In contrast, with pork, information
transmission is almost always possible, as we show in the following section.
6 Pork As A Signal
We now turn to our main question: under asymmetric information about the state z, can
pork be used to signal z? We now show that a separating (i.e., signaling) equilibrium is
possible when pork is available. Not only is signalling possible, but for all values of X, the
17unique PBE satisfying the Intuitive Criterion is separating. This result is summarized in the
following proposition, whose proof can be found in Appendix C.
Proposition 3 For any X 2 (￿1;R(￿max)), a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
exists. There is a unique separating equilibrium that satis￿es the intuitive criterion, and it
always contains a positive amount of pork provided to at least one legislative district. No
pooling equilibrium satis￿es the intuitive criterion.
Proof: See Appendix.
Possible political equilibria under asymmetric information are illustrated in Figure 1.
The central axis gives the ranking of ￿vg (g) for di⁄erent values ￿ 2 fz; ￿ z;z + ￿; ￿ z + ￿g and
￿(￿). The top and bottom panels give the location of the value 1 relative to these terms
for z = z and z = ￿ z, respectively. Dotted lines indicate the cuto⁄s between regimes. This
divides the state-space into three regions, depending on whether the z = z proposal is RPM,
Partial BAU, or Complete BAU.
In a separating equilibrium, when z = z the agenda setter proposes policies identical to
the full information equilibrium for z = z: This may be seen in the upper panel of Figure 1.
When z = ￿ z, the agenda o⁄ers the best legislation (from her perspective) that the centrist
would accept, but with the additional constraint that the proposed policy signals that z = ￿ z.
This constraint is as described in (16).
6.1 Separating equilibrium ￿the basic argument
Proving the existence of a separating equilibrium relies on constructing such an equilibrium,
where the essence of the construction is useful in understanding the result. The key point
is that since the agenda setter values spending less when z = z than when z = ￿ z, a costly
marginal increase in tax revenues relative to the status quo could be used for a small enough
increase in g (so that the agenda setter would accept it only if z = ￿ z) and a large enough
remainder in pork going to the centrist that he agrees to the change when the state is revealed
to be ￿ z. Crucial to the argument is that the marginal tax increase goes neither entirely to
higher g nor to pork, but is divided in such a way to make both the z = ￿ z agenda setter
and the centrist better o⁄(the latter to satisfy his participation constraint) but to leave the
z = z no better o⁄ (to satisfy the separation condition).
18Figure 1: Equilibrium under asymmetric information
Consider a marginal deviation from the status quo where an in￿nitessimal increase (of
unit measure) in tax revenues is used to ￿nance a combination of higher public expenditure
￿g and pork to the centrist of ￿sC = 1 ￿ ￿g, and such that






(z + ￿)vg (gq)
< 1: (18)
In words, consider a fraction ￿g of the tax increase such that the marginal cost of the
increase in taxation is just equal to the marginal value of the increase in g to the agenda
setter if z = z. This is obviously budget feasible since (z + ￿)vg (gq) > ￿(￿q) (the left-wing
agenda setter supports an increase in public goods spending even when z = z). This change
leaves the centrist better o⁄. To see this, observe that the utility of the centrist changes by
￿U
C = ￿ zvg (g
q)￿g + 1 ￿ ￿g ￿ ￿(￿
q);
or, using (18), the change in the centrist￿ s utility is
￿U
C = [￿ zvg (g
q) ￿ 1]
￿(￿q)
(z + ￿)vg (gq)
+ 1 ￿ ￿(￿
q):
19￿UC ￿ 0 is equivalent to
1 ￿ ￿ zvg (gq)





This inequality must hold since ￿ zvg (gq) > ￿(￿q) (the centrist supports an increase in public
goods spending when he believes the state is ￿ z) and (z + ￿)vg (gq) > ￿(￿q): Hence, such a
deviation always makes the centrist better o⁄.
The deviation also increases the agenda setter￿ s utility when z = ￿ z. Her utility increases
if and only if
(￿ z + ￿)vg (g
q)￿g ￿ ￿(￿
q) ￿ 0;
which using (18) in this inequality yields
(￿ z + ￿)vg (gq)




which always holds as z = ￿ z. Hence, regardless of the value of X, there is a policy ^ ￿ =
￿
￿;g;sC;s￿￿
strictly di⁄erent than ￿q = f￿q;gq;0;0g that is acceptable to the coalition if
z = ￿ z but would not be if z = z, thus signaling the state.
The formal proof shows that this argument demonstrates that ^ ￿ satis￿es the Cho-Kreps
criterion in ruling out ￿q. Moreover, the necessary conditions for an intuitive separating
equilibrium indicate that only one separating equilibrium may satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Finally, one may show that no pooling equilibrium satis￿es the intuitive criterion.
The intuition of why pork allows a policy response when z = ￿ z, a response that would
not be possible if pork were outlawed, may be explained as follows. The combined task of
signalling and coalition building requires aiding and hurting di⁄erent legislators ￿and in
di⁄erent states of nature ￿di⁄erentially. Hurting the agenda setter di⁄erently when z = z
and z = ￿ z can be done in two ways, each optimal under di⁄erent conditions. One is for the
agenda setter to ￿nance increased government spending with decreases in her own pork in a
magnitude that she would ￿nd acceptable only if z = ￿ z, where the value of the public good
relative to pork is high. This will be acceptable to the centrist, as he is always happy to see
public goods funded with the agenda setter￿ s pork. In fact, once he learns that z = ￿ z, he
will be willing to forgo pork in favor of the public good as well.
Alternatively, the agenda setter can raise tax revenues to ￿nance public good expendi-
tures. As demonstrated above, if few enough of the tax resources are allocated to public
20good expenditure, only when z = ￿ z would the agenda setter be willing to tolerate the cost
of public funds required to ￿nance them, hence signaling that z = ￿ z. However, for this
to be an equilibrium, the residual tax revenues cannot simply be ￿burned￿ , which points
to the coalition-building aspect of pork. As was the case when pork was restricted, a tax-
expenditure trade-o⁄ that is unacceptable to the agenda setter when z = z will also be
unacceptable to the centrist in either state of nature. Rather than disposing of the remain-
ing tax revenues, the agenda setter uses them to bribe the centrist to accept the policy
proposal. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that with pork, a joint signalling-coalition build-
ing proposal is always feasible.
The popular view of pork is that it is wasteful because it sacri￿ces the common good for
sectorial interests. But this is precisely what make pork a potent information-transmission
tool. The joint task of signalling and coalition building cannot be achieved with common-
good instruments alone if di⁄erent factions disagree on the nature of the common good. An
additional, discriminatory instrument is required, and pork is particularly suited for this
task.
We note that this additional instrument need not be pork. Other policies (such as speci￿c
legislative details) that have di⁄erential e⁄ects both across legislative districts and across
￿states of nature￿would serve the same purpose, if they signal the state and allow a coalition
to be formed to support a policy change. In equilibrium information and participation
constraints are always binding: the information constraint requires the agenda setter to
harm herself (di⁄erentially relative to the z = z state) while participation requires making
the centrist better o⁄ than he would be in status quo. Hence, one requires redistribution
both across districts and across states of nature. Thus policies that are usually viewed as
ine¢ cient may be required. Use of a policy that a⁄ects the ￿common good￿would not work.
6.2 Provision of pork when z=ﬂ z
As noted in Proposition 3, the z = ￿ z proposal must involve the allocation of pork. Under
asymmetric information, the regime must be either Complete or Partial BAU when z = ￿ z;
RPM does not occur. The ￿rst order conditions which determine the possible regimes in
PBE are in Appendix B. We here characterize the two regimes.
216.2.1 Complete BAU
The ￿rst order conditions imply that in a Complete BAU, the informational constraint may
or may not be binding. In the latter case, it is the centrist￿ s participation constraint that is
binding and that determines the transfer sC to the centrist. The agenda setter proposes the
z = ￿ z full information equilibrium which the z = z agenda setter would not want to mimic.
That is, the agenda setter under z = ￿ z and has no need to alter her full information proposal
in order to signal the state. The equilibrium is characterized by
1 = [2￿ z + ￿]vg (g) = 2￿(￿) (19a)
s
C = ^ u(￿
q) ￿ ^ u(￿) + ￿ z [v (g
q) ￿ v (g)] (19b)
s
￿ = R(￿) ￿ X ￿ g ￿ s
C: (19c)
Condition (19a) says that that the common marginal values to the coalition of both pork and
the public good must equal the common marginal cost of taxation. The tax rate that satis￿es
this condition is ￿BAU in (14) . Condition (19b) determining sC is the centrist￿ s participation
constraint implying indi⁄erence between the status quo and the agenda setter￿ s proposal,
with residual revenues going to s￿. This proposal will satisfy the informational constraint
(16) with inequality.
Alternatively, when the information constraint is binding, the z = ￿ z agenda setter cannot
signal the state with her full information proposal and must ￿distort￿ (￿;g) away from
this policy. In this case, the problem￿ s ￿rst order conditions imply that the equilibrium is
characterized by ￿ = ￿BAU and
￿
g;sC;s￿￿
given jointly by (19b), (19c), and (16) holding
with equality. Complete BAU can occur in state z = ￿ z only when separating from a Complete
BAU proposal in z = z . Thus this regime is represented in the right-most region of the
lower panel of Figure 1.
6.2.2 Partial BAU
In Partial BAU only one legislator gets pork. Partial BAU may occur when separating from
any of the three z = z regimes. In contrast to the full information case above, it may be
either the centrist or the agenda setter who receives pork when z = ￿ z.
22If it is the centrist who receives pork, we once again may be in an equilibrium in which
the information constraint is or is not binding. In the latter case, the proposed policy is
identical to one that would be proposed under full information with z = ￿ z. This policy
￿
￿;g;sC￿
solves (19b), (19c), and
1 ￿ ￿ zvg (g)





where the proposed values g and ￿ satisfy (16) with inequality. In contrast, when the
information constraint binds, that is, (16) holds with equality, signaling ￿ z would require a
further increase in pork to the centrist to inform him that z = ￿ z. This policy is characterized
by (19b), (19c), and (16).
Under di⁄erent parameter values, it is possible that the agenda setter rather than the
centrist will obtain pork barrel spending under Partial BAU. This would occur if there were
a pork-free policy available to the z = ￿ z agenda setter su¢ cient to signal that z = ￿ z and
also to ensure the participation of the centrist once he is informed that z = ￿ z, with the
centrist￿ s participation constraint holding with some slack.16 In this case, if the marginal
value of pork exceeded the agenda-setter￿ s marginal value of g, she would then exploit the
slack in the centrist￿ s participation constraint to obtain some pork barrel spending for her
own district.17
6.2.3 ... versus RPM when z is low
It is perhaps most surprising that when the z = z equilibrium legislation is RPM, the
z = ￿ z legislation is always Partial BAU, as it violates two intuitive results under complete
16The possibility of signaling that z = ￿ z and satisfying the centrist￿ s participation constraint without
pork may seem to contradict the logic of Proposition 2. We argued there that when pork is outlawed, a
policy that is far enough to the left to signal that z = ￿ z is too far to the left to allow the participation of the
centrist. What allows signaling without pork when z = ￿ z is the availability of pork when z = z. The use of
pork to bribe the centrist when z = z gives the agenda setter some surplus relative to the status quo in that
state. When z = ￿ z, separating equilibrium requires that the centrist be better o⁄ than in the status quo,
but the z = z agenda setter be worse o⁄ than under the z = z policy proposal. When pork is unavailable
the latter policy proposal is the status quo as well, so that the two objectives are contradictory. But when
pork is used when z = z, the policy proposal in that state gives the agenda setter a higher utility than in the
status quo. There may therefore some no-pork policies that make the z = ￿ z agenda setter worse o⁄ relative
to the z = z proposal, but the centrist better o⁄ relative to the status quo.
17In Baron and Diermeier (2001), where legislators have preferences over policy, the agenda setter can
use the unsuitabilty of the staus quo to other legislators to extract rents from them.
23information and homogenous agents. First, we would expect that pork be eliminated when
X is su¢ ciently high (or 1 is su¢ ciently far to the left in Figure 1). Second, we would
expect that pork is always decreasing in z all else equal. For example, in Battaglini and
Coate (2008) at a given level of debt there may be pork in equilibrium for low but not high
value of the public good, but not vice versa.
We note ￿rst that in the part of the state space where the z = z proposal would be
RPM under asymmetric information, the regime would be RPM under complete information,
regardless of the value of z. A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for this to be the case
is zvg (R(￿q) ￿ X) > 1 (and hence all other magnitudes along the central axis of Figure
1 are also greater than 1). Such a ranking could result from a high level of pre-existing
￿scal obligations, re￿ ecting for example,a high level of existing debt. High X would mean
high taxes ￿ but low g, hence, high values of ￿(￿q) and vg (R(￿q) ￿ X). Under complete
information, where legislators are homogeneous in their valuation of the public good, a high
value of the public good implies that no pork is distributed.
This intuition doesn￿ t hold under asymmetric information and legislator heterogeneity
precisely because of these two features. Under asymmetric information pork is used to
signal the value of the public good to less informed legislators who know the agenda setter
has di⁄erent preferences but do not know the state. That is, pork is used precisely because
the public good is valuable and the informed agenda setter wants to signal this information,
and the signal is most valuable to the agenda setter when the public good is most valuable.
Hence, provision of pork is not antithetical to ￿responsible policy making￿but in fact crucial
to policy being able to respond to a high valuation of the public good. And, pork is given
to the centrist under asymmetric information even though he gets higher direct utility from
public goods.
6.3 Illustration of allocation of pork
This result that pork is allocated when z = ￿ z under asymmetric information in cases where
RPM holds in both states under full information may be better understood from Figure 2,
showing points of indi⁄erence with the status quo and the (top, blue) budget line. Signaling
of the state ￿ z requires the agenda setter when z = ￿ z to separate herself from the agenda
setter when z = z. Hence, signaling requires a non-empty lens between the (second from
24top, green) indi⁄erence curve of the agenda setter when z = z and the (bottom right, black)
indi⁄erence curve of the agenda setter when z = ￿ z. Both these indi⁄erence curves are drawn
under the assumption that the agenda setter gets no pork (an assumption that is con￿rmed
in equilibrium). For any proposed tax rate, separating requires the agenda setter to propose
a level of public good that the agenda setter would not tolerate at that tax rate if z = z.
She will never propose less of the public good than implied by the black line, as she prefers
the status quo to such a policies.
The vertical distance between the budget constraint and the level of public good proposed
will be given to the centrist in the form of pork sC. The agenda setter will not propose pork
for herself, as it does not help separate herself from the agenda setter when z = z, and
provides her with a lower marginal utility than that of public good provision. Destroying
resources rather than providing them to the centrist would not be e⁄ective either, as the
centrist￿ s participation constraint will be binding in equilibrium.
The lowest curve to intersect with the square (red) is the indi⁄erence curve of the centrist
when it has been revealed that z = ￿ z, while taking into account that the centrist receives
all residual pork. It thus represents the centrist￿ s participation constraint in the coalition
conditional on his having learned the state ￿ z. An equilibrium is the intersection of the green
and the red lines (so that the separating and the centrist￿ s participation constraints are both
binding and determine the equilibrium). Proposition 3 implies that the red line is below the
green line to the right of the status quo. A separating equilibrium in which pork is provided
is therefore feasible.
When z = z the agenda setter will not choose to mimic the z = ￿ z equilibrium, and
therefore z = z is known to the centrist. As we have seen, with this information set and
parameter values, the status quo is equilibrium.
7 When is Pork Welfare Improving?
We have concentrated on a positive analysis of pork, showing how pork may allow information
transmission about the state of nature which would be impossible in the absence of pork.
Can pork improve welfare relative to the case in section 5.2 where pork is outlawed? Two
basic results emerge from our analysis. First, under the bargaining protocol we consider
25Figure 2: Informational Pork in a Fiscal Crisis
here ￿where the agenda setter may make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers ￿the welfare e⁄ects of
restricting pork depend on how pork is allocated in equilibrium, when it is allowed. In
a partial BAU equilibrium in which it is the centrist who receives pork, allowing pork is
unambiguously welfare reducing even though it allows signaling of the state. Conversely if
the partial BAU equilibrium is one where it is the agenda setter who receives pork, allowing
pork unambiguously increases welfare in a crisis relative to the case where it is restricted.
Second, the result that pork is welfare-reducing in the ￿rst case even though it allows
signaling of the state depends critically on the assumption that the agenda setter extracts all
the surplus in the bargaining process. When the bargaining protocol is such that the agenda
setter does not obtain the entire surplus, pork may, more generally be welfare increasing.
On the ￿rst result, it is easy to show that the equilibrium illustrated in Figure 2 ￿in
which only the centrist gets pork in an information-revealing equilibrium ￿is not welfare
improving relative to the no pork status quo. At any fg;￿;fsigg; the utility of the centrist
when z = ￿ z is given by
U (￿ z) = ^ u(￿) + ￿ zv (g) + s
C: (20)
The utility of the representative agent is:








26where the second line follows from the fact that only the centrist receives pork. Since the
centrist￿ s participation constraint is binding, we have U (￿ z) ￿ Uq (￿ z) = 0, where Uq (￿ z) is
the utility of the centrist in status quo. But as U = U (￿ z) ￿ 2sC
3 ; it must be the case that
allowing pork, with the resultant equilibrium, is welfare reducing.
Conversely, when the equilibrium is such that it is the agenda setter but not the centrist
who receives pork in the separating equilibrium, an analogous argument shows the allow-
ing pork increases welfare when z = ￿ z relative to the case where it is restricted. At any
fg;￿;fsigg; the utility of the centrist when z = ￿ z in (20) is simply
U (￿ z) = ^ u(￿) + ￿ zv (g):
The utility of the representative agent is now








But the (binding) participation constraint of the centrist implies that U (￿ z) is equal to the
utility of the centrist (and the representative agent) in the status quo. Thus utility of the
representative agent is higher with pork than without (at the status quo). Whether pork is
welfare enhancing overall depends on whether this increase in welfare is enough to outweigh
the cost of pork being used when z = z, which always makes the representative agent worse
o⁄ than the status quo. One may show however that there are reasonable parameter values
for which expected welfare rises.
Key to these results is the agenda-setter￿ s extracting all surplus, due to the assumption
that she may make take-it-or-leave-it (TOL) o⁄ers. This means that the centrist￿ s partici-
pation constraint is always binding in this equilibrium and he receives no surplus. Since the
agenda setter always wants more spending independent of the state (￿ > ￿ z ￿ z, which is
precisely what gives pork an informative role), the agenda setter will use her agenda setting
power to push policy farther to the left (higher g) than is socially optimal. Hence the bar-
gaining protocol implies that the centrist ￿whose preferences over public goods mirror those
of the ￿average district￿￿is left just indi⁄erent between the status quo and the equilibrium
proposal. When combined with the assumption that the status quo is, by de￿nition, one
27where no pork is given, the result is that pork must lower welfare.
Given the centrality of the bargaining protocol for the possibly adverse welfare results of
allowing pork, it is natural to ask whether other bargaining protocols would have a similar
implication. A general answer to that question depends on the set of feasible bargaining
outcomes, which is why the positive analysis we have presented is important. The set of
bargaining outcomes is the set of points that are above both the red and black lines (so
that both legislators agree to participate) and below the green line (so that information is
conveyed) in Figure 2. Are there points inside this ￿lens￿that welfare dominate the status
quo? If so, a bargaining protocol the agenda-setter does not have all the bargaining power
can imply a political equilibrium that is not only quantitatively di⁄erent but qualitatively
di⁄erent as well, in that social welfare is higher.18
Consider parameter values so that ￿ approaches ￿ z￿z from above. We have seen in section
6.2.3 that with these parameter values pork will always be provided when z = ￿ z: With ￿
arbitrarily close to ￿ z ￿ z, z + ￿ is arbitrarily close to ￿ z: This means that the indi⁄erence
curve of the centrist without pork is everywhere arbitrarily close (from above) to the green
line. The with-pork indi⁄erence curve of the representative agent is however strictly below
this line (and therefore strictly below the green line) as (21) shows that the utility of the
representative agent is obtained by adding sC
3 to the no-pork utility of the centrist. We may
represent this in Figure 3, which adds this indi⁄erence curve, represented by the dotted line,
to Figure 2.
Any equilibrium policy above the dotted line, the indi⁄erence curve of the representative
agent that runs through the status quo, is welfare increasing relative to the equilibrium where
pork is outlawed. Thus the region between the dotted line and the green line is the set of
policies that are within the bargaining set of the agenda setter and the centrist that are
welfare improving. A bargaining protocol that instead of leading to the extreme outcome
represented by the square in this ￿gure, leads to such a point within the bargaining set,
would lead to a welfare-improving equilibrium.
Since the bargaining set with pork includes outcomes that imply higher welfare than
when pork is restricted to be zero, the question becomes whether such outcomes are po-
18This is a more general result in political models. A bargaining protocol such that bargaining power
is interior implies qualitatively di⁄erent results to one where one side may make TOL o⁄ers, sometimes
substantially so. See Drazen and Limªo (2008).
28Figure 3: Welfare Improving Pork
litically feasible. That is, is there a legislative decision-making mechanism that will imply
one of these outcomes as the political equilibrium? As already indicated this would be one
in which the agenda-setter cannot make TOL o⁄ers, that is, where instead of a ￿closed-
amendment￿protocol, there is an ￿open-amendment￿protocol allowing coalition members
to make counterproposals in the political process.19 Analyzing what equilibria would ob-
tain under alternative, more realistic legislative decision-making procedures ￿and hence the
welfare consequences of pork under those processes ￿is the next item on our research agenda.
8 Conclusions
Pork-barrel spending is generally viewed as ￿politics as usual￿with lawmakers choosing to
make expenditures to bene￿t their constituents at the general expense and to be distinguished
from ￿responsible policy making￿when public goods have high value. In this paper we have
re-examined this view when all legislators are not equally informed and di⁄er in the value
they assign to public spending in the current economic situation. We argued that once one
considers legislators who are heterogeneous both in ideology and their information about
the economic situation, allocation of pork may serve a function in the legislative process of
19We note that experimental work on two-person ￿ultimatum games￿￿nds that proposers in fact do not
extract all the bargaining surplus but tend to propose a more even split. See, for example, Palfrey (2009).
29enabling the formation of coalitions to pass legislation appropriate to the situation.
Pork ￿greases the wheels￿of the legislative process, but does this not by bribing legislators
to accept legislation they view as harmful, but by conveying information about the state of
the world and hence the value of policy change. We showed that it may be impossible to
convey such information if signaling must be done via policies that a⁄ect welfare directly.
Hence, conceptually, we think it is incorrect to argue that pork is simply ￿politics as usual￿
that is a sign of the absence of responsible policy-making. As we argued in the previous
section, pork is not antithetical to ￿responsible policy making￿but in fact may be crucial to
policy being able to respond to a high valuation of the public good.
More generally, our results suggest that if signaling the value of policy change is im-
portant, it may better to use changes in policy that has no direct social bene￿t to convey
information and build coalitions rather than using changes in policy with direct social ben-
e￿ts. Or, a leader may want to signal the importance she assigns to larger policy goals
(for example, energy independence) by forgoing her preferred policy on smaller goals (for
example, by allowing o⁄shore oil drilling in speci￿c areas).
Our arguments are in line other work in political economy arguing that speci￿c political
institutions may be useful in conveying information. This may explain complex procedures,
for example, standing committees and restrictive amendment procedures, as in Gilligan and
Krehbiel (1987). As in the case of pork, information transmission may be important in an
otherwise reviled practice, for example, special interest lobbies who have superior information
about the e⁄ect of policies.
What should a reader take away from the paper? We think the general message is
three-fold. First, in analyzing how legislatures operate, assuming homogeneous legislators
may be reasonable for some questions but not others. This is more than the argument that
heterogeneity is the sine qua non of political economy (Drazen, 2000); this is well recognized.
It is the argument that the nature of heterogeneity may be crucial in analyzing political
phenomena and especially how legislatures operate. Second, and more speci￿cally, since
coalition-building among legislators with di⁄erent preferences is crucial to passing legislation,
the allocation of pork or ￿favors￿will play a role in the process. This too is recognized. Our
addition is to show that this role may be for better-informed legislative leaders to convince
less-informed legislators of the need for policy changes. Third, and most generally, our paper
presents yet another example of pitfalls in using representative agent models.
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31APPENDICES
A Analysis of full-information equilibrium
A.1 First order conditions of full-information problem
Let ￿ be the multiplier on the budget constraint (12c) and ￿
C the multiplier on the participa-
tion constraint of the centrist (12a). ￿
C and ￿
￿ are the non-negativity constraints on sC and
s￿, respectively. Then the ￿rst order conditions of the full-information problem, described
















We have four possible regimes, depending on the values of ￿
￿; ￿
C, i.e. whether the agenda
setter, the centrist, neither, or both receive pork.
The ￿rst such regime is Complete BAU where ￿
￿ = ￿
C = 0 and ￿ = ￿
C = 1; so that
2￿(￿) = (2z + ￿)vg (g) = 1
and s￿ and sC are found through (12a) and (12c).
A second possible regime is RPM, where s￿ = sC = 0. The analysis in Section ?? implies that
when z = z RPM equilibrium is at the status quo, ￿ = ￿q and g = gq. We analyze RPM
when z = ￿ z in Appendix A.2.
The ￿nal two regimes are Partial BAU and di⁄er depending on whether the agenda setter or
the centrist obtains pork in equilibrium. In Centrist Partial-BAU, the ￿rst order conditions
imply that g;￿; and sC are given jointly by (12a), (12c), with s￿ set to zero in the latter,
combined with
(z + ￿)vg (g)





We show in the proof of Proposition 1 that as long as p < 1
2, Partial BAU, where the agenda
setter￿ but not the centrist￿ receives pork, does not occur when z = z.
When z = ￿ z; the nature of the Agenda-Setter Partial-BAU equilibrium￿ where the agenda setter,
but not the centrist receives pork￿ depends on whether the participation constraint of the
centrist (12a) is binding in equilibrium or not. If at the policy ￿(￿) = (￿ z + ￿)vg (g) = 1;
(12a) is satis￿ed with sC = 0 then this is the Agenda-Setter Partial-BAU equilibrium.






vg (g) = 1:
A.2 Policy choice when z = ￿ z
We now set out the analysis of the full information case when z = ￿ z. When z = ￿ z, the
parameter assumptions imply
￿(￿
q) < ￿ zvg (R(￿
q) ￿ X) < (￿ z + ￿)vg (R(￿
q) ￿ X):
The important di⁄erence with respect to the z = z case is that even in RPM￿ even when both
legislators forgo pork￿ there will be a shift in policy, and equilibrium will not be at the status
quo. As the above set of inequalities shows, in the absence of pork, both legislators agree
that taxes aught to increase to ￿nance additional government expenditures relative to the
status quo.
We begin by analyzing RPM. If equilibrium is without pork, the agenda setter wishes to shift
policy to the left, with the objective of reaching her preferred pork-free policy, ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿).
Whether this policy is feasible depends on whether the centrist prefers ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) to the
status quo. To put this di⁄erently, let ~ ￿q (￿) 6= ￿q denote a pork-free policy that leaves a
legislator with preferences ￿ indi⁄erent with respect to the status quo20, de￿ned implicitly
by
^ u(~ ￿
q (￿)) + ￿v (R(~ ￿
q (￿)) ￿ X) = ^ u(￿
q) + ￿v (R(￿
q) ￿ X):
If ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) > ~ ￿q (￿ z) then the RPM equilibrium is at ￿ = ~ ￿ (￿ z): the agenda setter is trying to
shift policy to ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿), but given that this is unacceptable to the centrist, she proposes the
left-most policy the centrist would accept, which is ~ ￿ (￿ z). If in contrast ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) ￿ ~ ￿q (￿ z),
RPM equilibrium is ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿), which is feasible and leaves the centrist (weakly) better o⁄
relative to the status quo.
Which regime obtains under full-information when z = ￿ z depends then on the relative magni-
tude of ￿(￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) )and ￿(~ ￿q (￿ z)), and whether these two marginal costs of public funds
are greater than or smaller than 1. We have four cases depending on this ranking. In what
follows, we can think of adjusting from the status quo to equilibrium in two steps. First,
the agenda setter adjusts policy alone, without distributing pork, to the most the favorable
tax-expenditure mix from her perspective that the centrist would accept. That is, she shifts
policy to either ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) or ~ ￿q (￿ z). Then, if she wishes to, she begins to distribute pork and
adjust policy until reaching equilibrium. The four cases are as follows
1) ~ ￿q (￿ z) < ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿), ￿(~ ￿q (￿ z)) > 1: The ￿rst inequality implies that ~ ￿q (￿ z) is the best feasible
20Given that, in the absence of pork, preferences are single-peaked in ￿, there are always two tax rates
that give a legislator the same utility, unless the tax rate is already the preferred policy of the legislator.
~ ￿
q (￿) gives the tax rate that gives a legislator with a marginal valuation of the public good of ￿ the same
utility as the status quo.
33pork-free policy the agenda can obtain. The second inequality implies that both the agenda
setter and the centrist prefer this policy to one with pork. Equilibrium is RPM with ￿ =
~ ￿q (￿ z).
2) ~ ￿q (￿ z) < ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿), ￿(~ ￿q (￿ z)) < 1: As before, the ￿rst inequality implies that ~ ￿q (￿ z) is the
best feasible pork-free policy the agenda can obtain. However, the second inequality implies
that there may be a mix of pork and policy-shift that is feasible and preferable to the agenda
setter than the RPM policy of ~ ￿q (￿ z). Pork will be distributed to the centrist if and only if
(￿ z + ￿)vg (R(~ ￿q (￿ z)) ￿ X)
1 ￿ ￿ zvg (R(~ ￿q (￿ z)) ￿ X)
>
￿(~ ￿q (￿ z))
1 ￿ ￿(~ ￿q (￿ z))
; (23)
while Complete BAU obtains if in addition









3) ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) < ~ ￿q (￿ z), ￿(￿￿ (￿ z + ￿)) > 1: The ￿rst inequality now implies that the agenda
setter￿ s preferred pork-free policy is feasible and moreover that the centrist￿ s participation
constraint is slack at the policy ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿). By the second inequality, the agenda is better o⁄
at this pork-free policy than any one that provides her own district with pork. She does not
need to provide pork to the centrist, as his participation constraint is slack. Thus equilibrium
is RPM at ￿ = ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿).
4) ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) < ~ ￿q (￿ z), ￿(￿￿ (￿ z + ￿)) < 1: Again, the best feasible pork-free policy for the
agenda setter is ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿), but the second inequality states that the agenda setter would
prefer to increase taxes beyond ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿) to ￿nance pork for her own district if feasible.
But according to the ￿rst inequality, the centrist￿ s participation constraint is slack at the
pork-free policy ￿￿ (￿ z + ￿), so that such an increase is feasible. In this case we therefore have
Partial BAU with the agenda setter obtaining pork, or Complete BAU if in addition









B First order conditions with asymmetric information
The maximization problem for a separating equilibrium de￿ned in De￿nition 1 yields the












+ ￿(1 ￿  ) ￿ z 
￿
vg (g) = ￿; (24)
￿
1 + ￿
C ￿  
￿
￿(￿) = ￿; (25)
1 + ￿
￿ ￿   = ￿; (26)
￿
C + ￿
C = ￿; (27)
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^ u(￿) + zv (g) + s
C ￿ [^ u(￿




C = 0; (28)
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C = 0 (30)
￿
￿s
￿ = 0 (31)
￿





  = 0 (32)
Where ￿;￿
C and   are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint, the participation
constraint of the centrist, and the informational constraint (32), respectively.   = 0 identi-
cally when the state is z = z. ￿
c;￿
￿ are the multipliers on the non-negativity constraints on
sC and s￿, respectively.
C Proof of Propositions
Proposition 1
If p < 1
2, there are three regions of the state space which are mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive.
1. RPM when ￿(￿q) > 1 or when 1 > ￿(￿q) > ((z + ￿)vg (gq)=(1 + ￿)vg (gq)). Neither
legislator gets pork and the equilibrium is the status quo;
When ￿(￿q) < 1 and ￿(￿q) ￿ (z + ￿)vg (gq)=(1 + ￿vg (gq)), there are two possibilities:
2. Complete BAU when
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g


























3. Partial BAU when
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g














Only the centrist gets pork.
Proof: We begin with a Lemma that shows that pork will not be allocated in equilibrium when
￿(￿q) > 1: The agenda setter does not wish to cut public expenditures nor increase taxes in
favor of pork, even if her district were the sole bene￿ciary, as (z + ￿)vg (gq) > ￿(￿q) > 1,
so that agenda setter￿ s marginal value of the public good and marginal cost of taxation
exceeds the marginal value of pork. The agenda setter moreover prefers a policy mix with
higher public expenditure and higher taxes, and will thus never propose an decrease in public
expenditure from the status quo. While the agenda setter would be willing to bear the cost
of higher taxation in order to increase the provision of public goods, there is no combination
of higher pork and public good expenditure which would persuade the centrist to deviate
from the status quo in that direction, as the marginal cost of taxation exceeds both 1 and
35zvg (gq). To conclude:
Lemma 1 When ￿(￿q) > 1 equilibrium is RPM.
The remainder of the proof considers the alternative where ￿(￿q) < 1. We begin by showing
that the agenda setter never obtains pork alone, put di⁄erently:
Lemma 2 If p < 1
2 the centrist always receives pork in Partial BAU. A Partial BAU where
the agenda setter but not the centrist receives pork, does not exist.
The proof of this proposition is as follows. If the centrist does not obtain pork, increasing tax
rates leaves the centrist worse o⁄relative to the status quo, even if all revenues contributed to
public good provision as ￿(￿q) > zvg (gq). Thus, if only the agenda setter obtains pork, this
has to be ￿nanced through decreases in public good expenditure, matched with a (smaller)
decrease in tax revenues. Consider then a decrease in public good provision of one unit,





This leaves the centrist indi⁄erent relative to the status quo and leaves 1 ￿ ￿R(￿) of re-
maining ￿scal room that can be allocated as pork to the agenda setter. This policy shift
increases the utility of the agenda setter if and only if
￿R(￿)￿(￿
q) ￿ (z + ￿)vg (g
q) + 1 ￿ ￿R(￿) ￿ 0;
which is equivalent to the ￿rst inequality in
￿(￿
q) ￿






The second inequality follows from the assumptions ￿ > ￿ z ￿ z and p < 1
2. Manipulating
policy to obtain pork barrel spending for herself, without allocating pork to the centrist can
only be bene￿cial to the agenda setter if ￿(￿q) < 1
2. But if this is the case, equilibrium must
involve pork allocation the centrist as well. As the agenda setter is reducing taxes along
the path to an equilibrium where the agenda setter alone receives pork, this counterfactual
equilibrium would have ￿(￿) < ￿(￿q) < 1
2: But this cannot be equilibrium, as a positive
deviation exists wherein taxes are increased (at a utility cost of less than one to the coalition)
and pork is distributed to both districts (at a utility value of one to the coalition). Thus
equilibrium cannot involve pork allocation to the agenda setter alone. The proof of this claim
relied on the su¢ cient (but not necessary) assumption that p < 1
2; so that the ￿crisis￿state
of z = ￿ z is less likely to occur than the z = z. If this assumption were reversed, a Partial
BAU with the agenda setter being the sole recipient of pork is possible. This relates to the
result in Baron and Diermeier (2001), where the agenda setter can exploit the inadequacy
36of the status quo for current conditions￿ in this case being more relevant for crisis conditions
rather than normal times￿ to obtain pork for her own district.
We now show that if ￿(￿q) < ((z + ￿)vg (gq)=(1 + ￿)), pork will be distributed in equilibrium,
at least to the centrist. The centrist would agree to increase taxes on the margin to raise
one unit of revenues if those revenues were used to ￿nance public good expenditures of ￿g









1 ￿ zvg (gq)
:
This deviation from the status quo is desirable to the agenda setter if
(z + ￿)vg (g
q)￿g ￿ ￿(￿
q):
The agenda setter would choose to provide the minimal amount of pork (and maximal
amount of the public good) consistent with the centrist￿ s participation, giving
(z + ￿)vg (gq)





as a necessary condition for the provision of pork to the centrist. Otherwise, there is no
combination of pork and public good provision that would both persuade the centrist to
deviate from the status quo and improve the utility of the agenda setter.
As (33) is equivalent to
￿(￿
q) ￿ (z + ￿)vg (g
q)=(1 + ￿vg (g
q))
whenever ￿(￿q) < 1; the previous paragraph proves the following lemma:
Lemma 3 If
￿(￿
q) > (z + ￿)vg (g
q)=(1 + ￿vg (g
q))
the centrist does not obtain pork in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 shows that if ￿(￿q) > 1; no pork will be distributed in equilibrium. Lemma 3 shows
that the centrist does not obtain pork if
1 > ￿(￿
q) > (z + ￿)vg (g
q)=(1 + ￿vg (g
q));
while the agenda setter never obtains pork along according to Lemma 2. Thus these three
lemmas combine to give the part (1) of the proposition.
Finally, we demonstrate that the appropriate inequality in
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g














37determines whether equilibrium is Partial- or Complete-BAU, as summarized in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 4 If the centrist obtains pork, then the agenda setter also obtains pork if and only
if
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g














This lemma completes the second and third part of the proposition. Its proof is as follows. As
the analysis in section A.1 shows, whether in Complete- or Partial- BAU, (22) holds. (In
the former case, both sides of the equation are equal to 1).
Consider increasing taxes and public expenditures relative to the status quo along both the
centrist￿ s participation constraint and the budget constraint, with s￿ = 0. This increases
the right hand side and decreases the left hand side of (33). Proceed until (22) is reached.
If (22) is reached at a point where both sides of the equation exceed 1 in value, equilibrium
must be partial-BAU, as reaching the complete BAU equilibrium is infeasible. If, on the
other hand, (22) is reached at a point where both sides of the equation are smaller than 1;
equilibrium must be complete BAU, as from this point, the marginal cost of taxation and
the marginal value of public goods to the coalition as a whole are both smaller than 1, which
is the marginal value of pork to the coalition.
The cuto⁄between partial and complete BAU is the value of X that allows both the participa-
tion constraint and the budget constraint to hold with equality with ￿ = ￿BAU; g = gBAU,
and s￿ = 0. The participation constraint gives
s
C = ^ u(￿
q) + zv (g









which put into the budget constraint yields:
^ u(￿
q) + zv (g














which gives the condition in Lemma 4 and parts (2) and (3) of the proposition.
Proposition 3
For any X 2 (￿1;R(￿max)), a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists. There is a
unique separating equilibrium that satis￿es the intuitive criterion, and it always contains a
positive amount of pork provided to at least one legislative district. No pooling equilibrium
satis￿es the intuitive criterion.
Proof: We begin by showing that a separating equilibrium exists that satis￿es the intuitive
criterion. To do so, we ￿rst outline in Lemma 5 a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a
separating equilibrium.
Lemma 5 Let ￿ =
￿
￿;g;sC;s￿￿
denote a legislative proposal. A separating equilibrium
that satis￿es the intuitive criterion exists if there exists a policy proposal ^ ￿ 6= ￿q (where
38￿q ￿ f￿q;gq;0;0g), such that
(1) The z = ￿ z agenda setter is no worse o⁄ with proposal ^ ￿ than with ￿q.
(2) The centrist is no worse o⁄ with proposal ^ ￿ than with ￿q, if his beliefs are ~ z = ￿ z on
observing the proposal ^ ￿.
(3) The z = z is worse o⁄ with proposal ^ ￿ than with ￿q, if the centrist￿ s beliefs ~ z = ￿ z on
observing the proposal ^ ￿.
Proof. According to conditions (1) and (2), ^ ￿ is a policy that makes the agenda setter better
o⁄than the status quo, and makes the centrist better o⁄than the status quo conditional on
~ z = z = ￿ z. Thus the status quo cannot be the equilibrium if the centrist￿ s beliefs are ~ z = ￿ z
on observing the proposal ^ ￿. At the same time, ^ ￿ cannot be the the z = z agenda setter￿ s
optimal proposal, as she can always do better by proposing the status quo, according to
condition (3). Thus there is some policy ￿ ￿ (which may or may not be identical to ^ ￿) from
which the agenda setter does not wish to deviate if ~ z = ￿ z on observing that proposal, and
which the z = z would never propose. Bayes￿law implies then that the centrist updates his
beliefs to ~ z = ￿ z on observing the proposal ￿ ￿: This constitutes the z = ￿ z policy in a separating
PBE.
We now show that a policy ^ ￿ that satis￿es conditions the conditions in Lemma 5 exists for any
parameter values. Consider a marginal deviation from the status quo where an in￿nitessimal
increase (of unit measure) in tax revenues is used to ￿nance a combination of higher public
expenditure ￿g and pork to the centrist of ￿sC = 1 ￿ ￿g, and such that this proposal
exactly satis￿es condition (3) in Lemma 5:
(z + ￿)vg (g
q)￿g = ￿(￿
q):
This last equation can be rewritten as
￿g =
￿(￿q)
(z + ￿)vg (gq)
< 1: (34)
￿g gives a change in public good expenditures such that the marginal cost of a unit increase
in tax revenues is equal to the marginal value of the increase in public good provision, from
the perspective of the agenda setter if z = z: This is true regardless of the beliefs of the
centrist. The inequality in (34) demonstrates that such a deviation is budget-feasible, as
￿sC = 1 ￿ ￿g > 0, so that the deviation entails an increase, rather than a decrease in
pork to the centrist. (Starting from the status quo, where sC = 0,the latter would require a
negative amount of pork, which is not feasible.)
Such a deviation always makes the centrist better o⁄. The utility of the centrist changes by
￿U
C = ￿ zvg (g
q)￿g + 1 ￿ ￿g ￿ ￿(￿
q):
39Using (34) this gives
￿U
C = [￿ zvg (g
q) ￿ 1]
￿(￿q)
(z + ￿)vg (gq)
+ 1 ￿ ￿(￿
q):
So the utility of the centrist increases if and only if
1 ￿ ￿ zvg (gq)





But as ￿ zvg (gq) > ￿(￿q) (in the numerators) and (z + ￿)vg (gq) > ￿(￿q) (in the denomina-
tors), this inequality must always hold. Thus the described deviation satis￿es condition (2)
in Lemma 5 as well.
Finally, condition (1) of the lemma holds if the deviation increases the agenda setter￿ s utility
when z = ￿ z. Her utility increases if and only if
(￿ z + ￿)vg (g
q)￿g ￿ ￿(￿
q) ￿ 0:
Using (34) in this inequality gives
(￿ z + ￿)vg (gq)




which always holds as ￿ z > z. Thus this deviation constitutes a policy that satis￿es conditions
(1) to (3) in Lemma 5, for any value of X. Lemma 5 then states that a separating equilibrium
exists
The necessary conditions for an intuitive separating equilibrium in Appendix B indicates that
only one separating equilibrium may satisfy the intuitive criterion. It remains to show that
no pooling equilibrium satis￿es the intuitive criterion. We have thus demonstrated that a
separating equilibrium exists and it is the unique separating equilibrium. It remains to show
that no pooling equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 states that in the absence of pork, pooling at the status quo is the only possible
equilibrium. This implies that the only possible pooling equilibrium with no pork (RPM)
is at the status quo. However, the discussion above shows that pooling at the status quo
cannot satisfy the intuitive criterion. We outlined a deviation from the status quo that would
not be bene￿cial to the agenda setter when z = z; regardless of the beliefs of the centrist.
In order to satisfy the intuitive criterion, the centrist￿ s o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs must then
set ~ z = ￿ z on observing this deviation. But given these beliefs, the agenda setter can improve
her welfare by proposing such a deviation when z = ￿ z. Thus pooling at the status quo is not
an equilibrium when o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are constrained to satisfy the intuitive
criterion.
Now consider a pooling equilibrium that contains pork. In such an equilibrium, the z = ￿ z
agenda setter proposes a policy that solves (11) to (12d) with z = ￿ z and ~ z = ze. The z = z
40agenda setter mimics this proposal. With the information set ~ z = ze, the status quo is the
centrist￿ s preferred policy without pork, so that any deviation from the status quo requires
sC > 0. With the non-negativity constraint on the centrist￿ s pork slack, the ￿rst order






(￿ z + ￿)vg
￿
gpool￿
1 ￿ zevg (gpool)
; (35)
with both sides of the equation equalling one in Complete BAU.
We now show that this candidate pooling equilibrium cannot satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Consider a deviation from this proposal in which taxes are increased by an in￿nitessimal





(z + ￿)vg (gpool)
with the remaining revenues allocated to pork to the centrist: ￿sC = 1 ￿ ￿g. It would be
never be in the interest of the agenda setter to deviate from equilibrium in such a way when
z = z, regardless of the beliefs of the centrist. The intuitive criterion then requires that on
observing such a deviation, the centrist updates his beliefs to ~ z = ￿ z, as such a deviation
would, in contrast, increase the utility of the agenda setter by


















This deviation relaxes (or tightens) the centrist￿ s participation constraint by the discrete







(plus other in￿nitessimal terms). This term re￿ ects the
fact that updating the centrist￿ s beliefs from ~ z = ze to ~ z = ￿ z, alters his perceived valuation of
proposed public consumption relative to that in the status quo. This term is positive if and
only if gpool > gq, i.e. if proposed public expenditure in the candidate pooling equilibrium
is greater than in the status quo. With beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion, a pro￿table
deviation exists for the z = ￿ z agenda setter, if gpool > gq.
When on the other hand gpool < gq; a pro￿table deviation is available to the agenda setter
when z = z. Consider a deviation from the candidate pooling equilibrium such that tax
revenues decrease by an in￿nitessimal margin (of unit measure), ￿nanced by a decrease in





(￿ z + ￿)vg (gpool)
;
with the remainder ￿nanced by cutting the centrist￿ s pork allocation. This deviation is
unacceptable to the agenda setter when z = ￿ z, regardless of the centrist￿ s beliefs. The
intuitive criterion then requires that ~ z = z when the centrist observes this proposal, as the
agenda setter does ￿nd such a deviation pro￿table when z = z; conditional on the centrist￿ s











￿ z + ￿
￿
> 0:
On observing such a deviation from the pooling equilibrium, the centrist￿ s participation







; which is positive if gpool < gq.
When beliefs are restricted to satisfy the intuitive criterion, a deviation from the candidate
pooling equilibrium exists either when z = ￿ z or when z = z, depending on whether whether
gpool > gq or gpool < gq, respectively. In either case, no pooling equilibrium can be sustained
with beliefs that satis￿es the intuitive criterion. In contrast, we have shown that a unique
separating equilibrium supported by intuitive o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs always exists.
Having shown above that this equilibrium always contains pork completes the proof.
42